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IS IT AUTOMATIC?: THE MENS REA 
PRESUMPTION AND THE INTERPRETATION 
OF THE MACHINEGUN PROVISION OF 18 
U.S.C. § 924(C) IN UNITED STATES v. BURWELL 
SHANNYN GAUGHAN* 
Abstract: In United States v. Burwell, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed en banc the question of whether the 
Government must prove that the Defendant knew of the firearm’s automatic 
capability before invoking 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii)’s mandatory thirty-
year minimum sentence. The majority affirmed the Defendant’s conviction, 
holding that the D.C. Circuit’s previous holding in United States v. Harris de-
termined that no mens rea applies to the machinegun provision. The dissent-
ing opinion, however, argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. O’Brien, in which the Court held that the automatic capability of the 
firearm was an element of the offense, calls for the mens rea presumption to 
extend to that element. This Comment explains the differences in interpreta-
tion of the mens rea presumption between the majority and dissent, and argues 
that the dissenting opinion more accurately reflects the fundamental principles 
of the mens rea presumption. 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 15, 2005, a jury convicted Bryan Burwell and several co-
defendants of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) 
conspiracy and an armed bank robbery conspiracy.1 In addition, the jury 
also convicted Burwell independently of armed robbery and of using or car-
rying a machinegun during the course of committing a violent crime.2 The 
federal district court judge sentenced Burwell to eleven years and three 
months for the RICO conspiracy conviction, eleven years for the armed 
bank robbery conviction, and five years for conspiracy to commit armed 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE (2013–2014). 
 1 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2006); United States v. Burwell (Burwell I), 
690 F.3d 500, 502–03 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (en banc); see also United States v. Burwell (Burwell II), 
642 F.3d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2011), aff’d en banc, 690 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 2 Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 503; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) (federal criminal 
statute for using or carrying a weapon during the course of committing a violent crime); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2113(d) (2006) (federal criminal statute for armed robbery). 
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robbery, all to be served concurrently. 3 In addition, the judge sentenced 
Burwell to thirty years, to be served consecutively with the other three sen-
tences, for using or carrying a machinegun during the armed robbery.4 
Burwell appealed, arguing that the Government failed to present suffi-
cient evidence of his knowledge of the automatic character of his weapon 
and thus failed to support a conviction under the federal firearms offense 
statute—18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii).5 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit affirmed Burwell’s conviction and sentence, relying on its prior de-
cision in United States v. Harris, which held that a defendant need not have 
knowledge of the automatic character of the gun in order to be convicted 
under § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii).6 Burwell then sought a rehearing en banc.7 
Upon rehearing en banc, the judges of the D.C. Circuit narrowed their 
review to deciding a single question: whether the Government must prove 
that a defendant knew of the automatic capability of the weapon used before 
a judge may invoke the mandatory thirty-year minimum sentence required 
by § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii).8 The circuit judges diverged on the issue, publishing 
two concurring opinions and two dissenting opinions in addition to the ma-
jority opinion, with each opinion differing in its interpretation and applica-
tion of precedent from both the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court. 9 
Namely, the judges disagreed about the effect of the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in United States v. O’Brien—which held that the machinegun provision 
of § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) is an offense element and not a sentencing factor.10 
Ultimately, the majority affirmed Burwell’s mandatory and consecutive thir-
ty-year sentence by holding that no mens rea applied to the machinegun 
provision.11 In contrast, Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh maintained in his dis-
                                                                                                                           
 3 Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 502–03. 
 4 Id. 
 5 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii); Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 502–03. On appeal, Burwell challenged 
only the mandatory thirty-year consecutive sentence imposed because of the automatic capability 
of the firearm used in the robbery. See Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 502–03. 
 6 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii); Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 503 (citing United States v. Harris, 
959 F.2d 246, 258–59 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
 7 Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 503. Appellate review en banc may be granted to clarify inconsistent 
decisions within a circuit court. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(1)–(2). The entire panel of judges from 
within the circuit, rather than a selected panel of three judges generally used for appellate review, 
decide cases reviewed en banc. See id. 
 8 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii); Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 502. 
 9 See Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 502, 515–17, 519, 527–28. 
 10 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii); Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 502, 505, 542; United States v. 
O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2010). 
 11 Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 516. Mens rea refers to the state of mind that a defendant must be 
proven to possess in order for the proscribed conduct to amount to a crime. See Morissette v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 264 (1952). In Morissette, the Supreme Court explained that mens 
rea is the “mental element” required for injurious conduct to amount to a crime. See id. 
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senting opinion that the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Brien required a 
mens rea of “knowingly” for the machinegun element.12 
Part I of this Comment summarizes the facts relevant to Burwell’s case 
and the procedural history resulting in an en banc review by the D.C. Cir-
cuit. Part II elaborates on the divergent interpretations of O’Brien and Har-
ris, as discussed by Judge Janice Brown’s majority opinion and Judge Ka-
vanaugh’s dissenting opinion, and includes an explanation of the mens rea 
presumption as presented in these two opinions. Finally, Part III argues that 
the majority’s decision reflects an unsettling resistance to the mens rea pre-
sumption, and undermines the retributive goals of the legal system. Part III 
also notes that despite the majority’s dismissal of the Supreme Court’s 
stance on mens rea in O’Brien, Judge Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion accu-
rately emphasizes the significance of the presumption of mens rea in ensur-
ing fundamental values of justice. 
I.  THE D.C. CIRCUIT AFFIRMS BURWELL’S CONVICTIONS AND GRANTS A 
REHEARING EN BANC TO RESOLVE COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS  
OF THE MENS REA PRESUMPTION AND 18 U.S.C. § 924(C)(1)(B)(II) 
Between 2003 and 2004, a gang of bank robbers engaged in a series of 
violent bank robberies in the Washington, D.C. area.13 The gang bought four 
AK-47 automatic assault rifles and used these weapons during their bank 
robberies.14 On one occasion, the gang used these weapons to shoot at a po-
lice car.15 Following this specific instance, Burwell joined the gang and par-
ticipated in two violent armed bank robberies.16 On both occasions, Burwell 
carried an AK-47, but there is no evidence that he ever fired his weapon.17 
Following a jury trial, a jury convicted all of the co-defendants of a 
RICO conspiracy and of a conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery.18 In 
addition, the jury returned a guilty verdict for Burwell, convicting him of 
armed robbery and of using or carrying a machinegun while committing a 
violent crime.19 The district court judge sentenced Burwell to concurrent 
terms of eleven years and three months for the RICO conspiracy conviction, 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 550, 553 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 13 United States v. Burwell (Burwell I), 690 F.3d 500, 502 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 502–03. The jury convicted the defendants of RICO conspiracy pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962(d) and of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 371. See 18 
U.S.C. § 371 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2006). 
 19 Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 503; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) (federal criminal 
statute that penalizes using or carrying a weapon during the course of committing a violent crime); 
18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (2006) (federal criminal statute for armed robbery). 
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eleven years and three months for the armed bank robbery conviction, and 
five years for the conspiracy to commit armed robbery conviction.20 In ad-
dition, the judge sentenced Burwell to an additional thirty years to be served 
consecutively pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) for carrying a ma-
chinegun during the robbery.21 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) provides that 
any person who is convicted of using or carrying a firearm in furtherance of 
a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime shall be sentenced to a man-
datory thirty-year minimum sentence of imprisonment, in addition to the 
punishment for the predicate crime.22 
Burwell appealed his conviction under § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) to the D.C. 
Circuit, arguing that the Government had failed to prove that Burwell knew 
of the automatic firing capability of the weapon he used, and therefore, had 
failed to present sufficient evidence to support the conviction.23 A panel of 
judges affirmed the district court’s conviction and sentence, holding that the 
Government did not need to prove Burwell’s knowledge of the automatic 
capability of the weapon because no mens rea requirement applied to the 
machinegun provision.24 The D.C. Circuit subsequently granted Burwell’s 
motion for a rehearing en banc to answer a narrow question of law: whether 
the Government must prove that a defendant knew of the automatic capabil-
ity of a weapon before a judge may invoke the mandatory thirty-year mini-
                                                                                                                           
 20 Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 503. 
 21 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii). 
 22 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (“If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation 
of this subsection . . . . is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm si-
lencer or firearm muffler, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 
30 years.”). For the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), the term “machinegun” is defined 
pursuant to § 5845(b) of the National Firearms Act, which defines “machinegun,” in relevant part, 
as “any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automati-
cally more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” National 
Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (2006). 
 23 Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 503. Before closing arguments at trial, the court granted the Gov-
ernment’s motion to preclude from closing arguments by the defense any argument that the De-
fendant could not have known of the automatic character of the firearm. Id. at 518 n.1. The court 
held that any such comment in a closing argument was “irrelevant and improper.” Id. (quoting 
United States v. Morrow, No. CRIM.A. 04-355CKK, 2005 WL 3163804 (D.D.C. June 20, 2005)). 
Burwell’s counsel did not oppose this motion at trial. See id. at 517–18 (Henderson, J., concur-
ring). 
 24 Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 503 (citing United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 257–59 (D.C. Cir. 
1992)). The D.C Circuit held that the decision in United States v. O’Brien did not affect the hold-
ing in United States v. Harris, that no mens rea applied to the machine gun provision, because 
O’Brien “expressly refrained from deciding” whether a mens rea applied to that element. See 
United States v. Burwell, 642 F.3d 1062, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2011). As the court explained, in the 
“absence of an affirmative statement of the Court, we adhere to our precedent in holding that con-
viction under § 924(c) does not require proof the defendant knew the weapon was a machinegun.” 
See id.; see also United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2010). 
2014] Mens Rea and the Interpretation of the Machinegun Provision 57 
mum sentence pursuant to § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), or whether the additional 
mandatory sentence may be imposed through strict liability.25 
In her concurring opinion, Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson reasoned 
that the present case should have been denied en banc review because the 
holding in United States v. Harris has been “clear and consistent for twenty 
years.”26 Nevertheless, the five separate opinions in this decision demon-
strate the varied understandings of the mens rea presumption after United 
States v. O’Brien.27 
II. DIVERGENT VIEWS OF THE MENS REA PRESUMPTION AND  
THE EFFECT OF O’BRIEN ON HARRIS 
Of the five opinions in United States v. Burwell, Judge Brown’s major-
ity opinion and Judge Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion most directly address 
the competing interpretations of the mens rea presumption.28 The two opin-
ions diverge most starkly in their understanding of United States v. Harris 
and United States v. O’Brien, two cases that have similarly addressed the 
machinegun provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 29  In the majority opinion, 
Judge Brown centered her analysis on the D.C. Circuit’s prior decision in 
Harris, as interpreted in light of the intervening Supreme Court decision of 
O’Brien.30 Conversely, in his dissent, Judge Kavanaugh reasoned that the 
ruling in O’Brien governed the case because it effectively overturned Har-
ris. 31  These opposite approaches reflect divergent understandings of the 
mens rea presumption.32 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 502–04. 
 26 Id. at 517 (Henderson, J., concurring). A review en banc is appropriate in two circumstanc-
es: to maintain consistency in the court’s case law, or to address questions of law that are of ex-
ceptional importance. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(1)–(2). 
 27 See Michael A. McCall et al., Criminal Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009–2010 
Term, 41 CUMB. L. REV. 227, 237 (2011) (noting that, despite the unanimity of the O’Brien deci-
sion, the case cannot “be characterized as exhibiting complete unanimity in that at least one con-
curring opinion was filed”). Compare Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 509 (stating that “we cannot say that 
the conceptual underpinnings of Harris have been weakened at all”), with id. at 542 (Kavanagh, J., 
dissenting) (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in O’Brien thus knocked out the funda-
mental underpinnings of this Court’s decision in Harris”). 
 28 See United States v. Burwell (Burwell I), 690 F.3d 500, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (en banc); id. 
at 528, 542, 553 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 29 See Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 505 (stating that United States v. Harris remains good law after 
United States v. O’Brien); id. at 528, 542, 553 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (explaining that 
O’Brien effectively overruled Harris); see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006); United States v. Harris, 
959 F.2d 246, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2010). 
 30 See Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 514–15. 
 31 See id. at 528 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 
619 (1994)). 
 32 See id. at 515 (majority opinion). Compare id. at 508 (“[T]his Court and others have fre-
quently found that certain offense elements do not require proof of an additional mens rea, so long 
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A. Precedent Decisions in Harris and O’Brien 
In Harris, the D.C. Circuit faced a challenge to the Defendant’s con-
viction under the machinegun provision of § 924(c) after the district court 
failed to instruct the jury to deliver a guilty verdict only if the Defendant 
knew of the gun’s automatic firing capability.33 The D.C. Circuit followed 
well-established rules of statutory interpretation to analyze the existence of 
any mens rea requirement in the provision.34 The D.C. Circuit acknowl-
edged the presumption of mens rea as delineated in Morissette v. United 
States, in which the Supreme Court noted that the traditional belief in free 
will requires that conduct can be made criminal only when done with the 
proper malicious intent. 35  Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit found that the 
structure of § 924(c) suggests that Congress intended strict liability to attach 
to the machinegun provision of the crime, and therefore the provision did 
not require an additional mens rea.36 
The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the mens rea requirement was satisfied 
in the machinegun provision because the Defendant needed to intentionally 
use a firearm in the commission of a drug trafficking or violent crime.37 
Whether the weapon used was automatic or not, the court in Harris ex-
plained, does not reflect any difference in the moral blameworthiness of an 
actor who is already guilty of intentionally engaging in the predicate 
crime.38 The Harris court therefore concluded that the fundamental purpose 
of the mens rea presumption is satisfied in the machine gun provision.39 
In O’Brien, the Supreme Court considered a challenge similar to the 
one posed in Harris.40 In O’Brien, the Government appealed a decision by 
the First Circuit that affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a thirty-year 
                                                                                                                           
as the offense as a whole carries a scienter requirement that separates innocent from criminal con-
duct.”), with id. at 528 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[T]he presumption of mens rea means that, 
unless Congress plainly indicates otherwise, the Government must prove the defendant’s mens rea 
for each element of the offense.”). 
 33 See Harris, 959 F.2d at 258; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 
 34 See Harris, 959 F.2d at 258. 
 35 See id. (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)). Morissette v. United 
States provides: 
 The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by in-
tention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature 
systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and 
duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil. 
342 U.S. at 250. 
 36 See Harris, 959 F.2d at 258; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 
 37 See Harris, 959 F.2d at 258–59. 
 38 See id. at 259. 
 39 See id. 
 40 See O’Brien, 560 U.S. at 221; see also Harris, 959 F.2d at 258. 
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minimum sentence pursuant to § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii).41 The district court had 
reasoned that the Government had failed to indict, charge, and prove the 
Defendant’s knowledge of the automatic character of the weapon.42 The 
Supreme Court accordingly addressed the narrow question of whether the 
machinegun provision is an element to be proved to a jury beyond a reason-
able doubt, or if it was only a sentencing factor to be found by a judge by a 
preponderance of the evidence.43 The Supreme Court unanimously held that 
the machinegun provision must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt as an 
element of the crime.44 The Court relied upon several considerations, in-
cluding the severity of the penalty and the drastic increase in punishment 
for use of an automatic weapon, which the Court suggested are indicative of 
Congress’s intent to create a separate substantive crime. 45 Although the 
Court affirmatively concluded that the machinegun provision was an ele-
ment of a substantive crime, the Supreme Court reserved comment on 
whether it was necessary to prove knowledge of the automatic capability of 
the weapon used.46 
B. Interpretations of the Effect of O’Brien on Harris by the Majority  
and Dissenting Opinions 
The majority and dissenting opinions in Burwell drew heavily on the 
precedential cases of O’Brien and Harris in interpreting the mens rea re-
quirement for § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii).47 The majority opinion in Burwell ruled that 
Harris remains good law in spite of O’Brien’s holding that the machinegun 
provision is an element of the offense and not a sentencing factor, as it was 
treated in Harris.48 Judge Brown stated that Harris did not turn on the classi-
fication of the machinegun provision as a sentencing factor.49Rather, Harris 
relied primarily on congressional intent, as evidenced by the structure of the 
statute, to penalize defendants who have been found guilty of the predicate 
crimes and whose weapon had an automatic firing capability.50 
                                                                                                                           
 41 O’Brien, 560 U.S. at 223–24; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii). 
 42 See O’Brien, 560 U.S. at 223–24. 
 43 Id. at 224. 
 44 See id. at 235, 241; see also Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 528 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (stating 
that “the Supreme Court has recently and unanimously ruled that the automatic character of the 
gun is an element of the Section 924(c) offense”). 
 45 See O’Brien, 560 U.S. at 218–19. 
 46 See Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 517 (Henderson, J., concurring). 
 47 See id. at 504 (majority opinion); id. at 528 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(B)(ii); O’Brien, 560 U.S. at 234–35; Harris, 959 F.2d at 259. 
 48 See Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 508–09; see also O’Brien, 560 U.S. at 234–35; Harris, 959 F.2d 
at 259. 
 49 See Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 505; see also Harris, 959 F.2d at 259. 
 50 See Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 505. 
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The clarification made in O’Brien, therefore, does not undermine the 
substantive holding in Harris that the mens rea presumption does not attach 
to the automatic character of the weapon.51 The majority noted that this pre-
sumption is reserved for essential elements of the offense that would other-
wise criminalize innocent conduct. 52 In addition, the concurring opinion 
noted that Burwell would not be prejudiced by an additional thirty-year 
mandatory minimum sentence because the evidence suggested that he knew 
that the gang used automatic AK-47s.53 
Conversely, in his dissenting opinion Judge Kavanaugh argued that 
O’Brien effectively overruled Harris by making the automatic nature of the 
weapon an element of the offense and thereby required the Government to 
prove Burwell’s knowledge of the weapon’s automatic capabilities.54 Judge 
Kavanaugh interpreted the mens rea presumption broadly, insisting that the 
presumption applies to each element of an offense, absent a plainly contrary 
intent by Congress.55 
The dissent argued, in opposition to the majority opinion, that the Su-
preme Court has never limited the mens rea presumption to elements of an 
offense that would otherwise criminalize innocent conduct.56 Rather, Judge 
Kavanaugh called for a broad interpretation of the mens rea presumption, 
such that it applies to essential elements of a statute “both when necessary 
to avoid criminalizing apparently innocent conduct . . . . and when neces-
sary to avoid convicting the defendant of a more serious offense for appar-
ently less serious criminal conduct.”57 He asserted that such an application 
of the mens rea presumption preserves fundamental principles of fairness 
and justice. 58 Accordingly, Judge Kavanaugh concluded that a mens rea 
applies to the automatic capability of the machinegun provision because it 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See id. at 508–09. Judge Brown noted in her opinion: 
 Absent either a clear statement from the Supreme Court establishing a presump-
tion of mens rea for every element of an offense or a clear demarcation in our 
caselaw between our treatment of elements and sentencing factors, we cannot say 
that the conceptual underpinnings of Harris have been weakened at all, much less 
weakened so much as to justify abandoning it. 
Id.  
 52 See id. at 508. 
 53 Id. at 518 (Henderson, J., concurring). 
 54 Id. at 528, 542, 553 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also O’Brien, 560 U.S. at 235; Harris, 
959 F.2d at 259. 
 55 See Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 528, 543 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 56 Id. at 543. 
 57 Id. at 529. 
 58 See id. at 527; see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) (stating that the 
presumption of mens rea supports the longstanding principle that ambiguous criminal statutes 
should favor lenity). 
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is an element that may lead to the conviction of a more serious crime re-
gardless of the defendant’s knowledge.59 
III. BURWELL’S HOLDING JEOPARDIZES A BROAD APPLICATION OF THE 
MENS REA PRESUMPTION 
The mens rea presumption, in accordance with the fundamental pre-
sumption of innocence afforded to each accused individual, ensures that 
criminal liability is imposed only on individuals who act with a culpable 
state of mind.60 The majority’s opinion threatens to undermine the retribu-
tivist goal of the mens rea presumption, which is to hold an individual crim-
inally responsible in proportion to his culpability.61 Moreover, the majority 
opinion risks the imposition of disproportionately high sentences based on 
the premise that a defendant has been deemed a bad actor.62 The majority’s 
interpretation of the mens rea presumption, as it stands after United States v. 
Harris and United States v. O’Brien, may lead to aggravated sentences de-
spite a defendant’s lack of moral culpability.63 
This result contradicts the purpose of the mens rea presumption and 
fails to achieve the proportionality of criminal culpability and liability that 
is an essential objective of the criminal justice system. 64 As Judge Ka-
vanaugh aptly reasoned in his dissent, “the fact that the defendant is a ‘bad 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 546 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 60 See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 (1985) (emphasizing that “‘an injury can 
amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention’” (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 
U.S. 246, 250 (1952))); Morissette, 342 U.S. at 275 (holding that a presumption that every de-
fendant possessed criminal intent “would conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence 
with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime”). 
 61 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (holding that “as a matter of principle . . . a 
criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convict-
ed.”); see also United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 235 (2010); United States v. Harris, 959 
F.2d 246, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 62 See United States v. Burwell (Burwell I), 690 F.3d 500, 530–31, 544 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (en 
banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 
1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 109 (1962)). In his article Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, Herbert 
Packer explains: 
 [T]o punish conduct without reference to the actor’s state of mind is both ineffi-
cacious and unjust. It is inefficacious because conduct unaccompanied by an aware-
ness of the factors making it criminal does not mark the actor as one who needs to 
be subjected to punishment in order to deter him or others from behaving similarly 
in the future . . . It is unjust because the actor is subjected to the stigma of a criminal 
conviction without being morally blameworthy. Consequently, on either a preven-
tive or a retributive theory of criminal punishment, the criminal sanction is inappro-
priate in the absence of mens rea. 
Packer, supra at 109. 
 63 See Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 544 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 64 See id. at 552–53; see also Solem, 463 U.S. at 290. 
62 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:E. Supp. 
person’ who has done ‘bad things’ does not justify dispensing with the pre-
sumption of mens rea in this fashion and imposing 20 years of additional 
mandatory prison time.”65 The decision in this case cuts deep into the fun-
damental values of justice in the criminal process and compromises the es-
tablished principles that have protected the rights of the accused.66 
Moreover, the majority opinion in United States v. Burwell encourages 
an ad hoc approach to determining whether an element of a crime requires a 
showing of a specific mens rea before criminal liability may be imposed.67 
Rather than adopting a clear rule that applies a mens rea to every element of 
a crime, the majority rule calls for a judicial analysis to determine whether a 
particular element of a crime requires a mens rea in order for the offense to 
criminalize certain conduct.68 Such an ad hoc approach deprives an actor of 
a clear warning that a harsh criminal penalty may be imposed for his or her 
conduct.69 
Judge Kavanaugh rightly asserted that where “the facts as the defend-
ant believed them would have warranted conviction of a lesser offense and 
called for a lesser punishment, no legitimate purpose of criminal law—
whether it be retribution, deterrence, or rehabilitation—is served by con-
victing him of an aggravated offense and imposing a more severe punish-
ment.”70 The majority holding in this case imposes unjustly severe penalties 
without fair notice to defendants and without legitimately advancing any 
deterrence or retributive goals.71 
Furthermore, Judge Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion suggests an inter-
pretation of the mens rea presumption that is more consistent with core prin-
ciples of criminal law.72 The extension of a mens rea to each element protects 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 544 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 66 See id. at 552–53. In Burwell, Judge Kavanaugh reasoned: 
Convicting a defendant of this Section 924(c) offense and imposing an extra 20 
years of mandatory imprisonment based on a fact the defendant did not know is un-
just and incompatible with deeply rooted principles of American law. The Supreme 
Court has applied the presumption of mens rea precisely to avoid such injustice. 
Id.  
 67 See id. at 546. 
 68 See id. at 503 (majority opinion); id. at 525 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). The majority states 
that the mens rea presumption extends only to essential elements that require a mens rea in order 
to avoid criminalizing otherwise innocent conduct. See id. at 508 (majority opinion). 
 69 See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427 (“Application of the rule of lenity ensures that criminal stat-
utes will provide fair warning concerning conduct rendered illegal and strikes the appropriate 
balance between the legislature, the prosecutor, and the court in defining criminal liability.”). 
 70 Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 544 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 71 See id. at 544, 552–53. 
 72 See id. at 543 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 304 (5th ed. 2010)). In his text-
book on criminal law, Wayne LaFave suggests that the idea that a “mistake by the defendant may 
be disregarded because of the fact that he actually intended to do some legal or moral wrong . . . is 
2014] Mens Rea and the Interpretation of the Machinegun Provision 63 
the presumption of innocence and prevents the prosecution from having an 
easy path to a conviction.73 Moreover, Judge Kavanaugh’s interpretation of 
the necessity of mens rea respects basic human values of human will and the 
autonomy to choose between good and evil.74 By broadly applying the mens 
rea presumption to every element of a crime, the dissenting opinion maintains 
the fundamental principles of lenity, notice, and culpability that have tradi-
tionally guided fairness and justice in our criminal system.75 
CONCLUSION 
By holding that the mens rea presumption did not extend to the ma-
chinegun provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), the decision in United 
States v. Burwell weakens the broad application of the mens rea presump-
tion to each element of a criminal offense. The majority in Burwell reached 
this decision despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. O’Brien 
that the automatic character of the firearm was an essential element of the 
offense. In the instant case, Burwell was sentenced to an additional thirty-
year imprisonment, despite the Government’s failure to prove that he knew 
of the automatic nature of the weapon. This added sentence is striking com-
pared to the eleven-year total sentence imposed for the other three offenses 
of which he was convicted. This outcome is demonstrative of the severe 
consequences that a defendant may suffer, notwithstanding the govern-
ment’s failure to prove his or her culpability, as a result of the majority deci-
sion. This narrowing interpretation of the mens rea presumption threatens to 
undermine its essential purpose, which is to ensure that criminal penalties 
resulting in loss of liberty are justified by criminal intent. 
Judge Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion, however, suggests a broad ap-
plication of the mens rea requirement that would require the Government to 
prove the defendant’s culpability for each element of a criminal offense be-
fore criminal liability could be imposed. Drawing from Supreme Court 
precedent in favor of a mens rea presumption, Judge Kavanaugh’s approach 
protects the fundamental principles of fairness that our criminal system re-
quires. 
                                                                                                                           
unsound, and has no place in a rational system of substantive criminal law.” LAFAVE, supra at 
304–05. 
 73 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263. 
 74 See id. 
 75 See Burwell I, 690 F.3d at 543, 545, 552 (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting); see also Liparota, 471 
U.S. at 427. 
